The pledge-and-review architecture of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change has been praised as a new model of global environmental governance. Instead of internationally agreed-upon emission reduction targets, the agreement relies on countries' repeated, voluntary pledges and actions. A key mechanism for monitoring progress toward shared global goals, putting pressure on countries to live up to their promises, and increasing ambition over time is the global stocktake. The stocktake's twin-purposes to act simultaneously as a review and ambition mechanism render it a global governance innovation. Absent a clear institutional precedent, the global stocktake presents a design challenge for the climate negotiation community. This paper develops a number of lessons for designing the stocktaking process based on a review of relevant scholarship and an analysis of the 2013-2015 Periodic Review as a limited precedent within the climate regime. While we cannot predict what will make the stocktake successful, these design principles could increase the chances for its effectiveness. These lessons offer potential guidance for decision-makers with implications for the future effectiveness of the Paris Agreement.
It is unclear whether and how undetermined voluntary contributions will add up to achieve the shared global goals established in the PA. Currently, there is a significant gap between Parties' promises, their post-Paris NDCs, and these goals, especially the goal of staying "well below 2 °C temperature increase above pre-industrial levels" UNEP 2017) . One of the three governance instruments that are supposed to address this major consistency and effectiveness challenge of the PA is the Global Stocktake (GST) (Article 14 PA). The other two instruments are the Enhanced Transparency Framework (Article 13 PA), which focuses on individual countries' progress toward their NDCs, and the Compliance Mechanism (Article 15 PA). In contrast, the GST is a hybrid between an effectiveness review and an ambition mechanism, intended to strengthen and accelerate climate action over time. As a review mechanism, the process is intended to track collective progress and reveal remaining action gaps. As an ambition (also "ratchet") mechanism, the GST is supposed to inspire and drive new activities that close any potential gaps between goals and trajectories. An ambition mechanism is a novelty in global governance, presenting a significant design challenge for the negotiation community with very limited prior experience to draw on.
The relationship between the GST and the Enhanced Transparency Framework (Article 13 PA) as well as Article 6 of the PA on voluntary cooperation in the implementation of NDCs merit deeper consideration, but are not a subject of this article. The PA's separation of assessing individual Parties' actions (Article 13 PA) and collective performance vis-à-vis global goals (Article 14 PA) is coherent with the agreement's governance logic that relies on voluntary contributions and skirts the idea of legally sanctioning Parties for their behavior. However, it creates challenges for regime effectiveness, because no Party can be held accountable for missing collective goals. Without a direct and transparent link between Parties' actions and global outcomes, countries have limited incentives to be ambitious. Laggards go undetected and leaders are not recognized. Like the GST, Article 6 PA could be interpreted as an ambition mechanism (Stua 2017) , enabling Parties to propose and achieve more ambitious NDCs via a range of cooperative approaches. These cooperation mechanisms could facilitate stronger collective mitigation outcomes.
We focus on the design challenges of the GST, which were negotiated by the Ad hoc Working Group of the Paris Agreement (APA) between 2016 and 2018. A welldesigned GST could provide transparency and become the needed "ratchet mechanism" to help increase Parties' ambition over time. A poorly designed GST could stifle and slow future progress. We ask which process characteristics would maximize the chances that the GST will be effective as both a review and ambition mechanism. We answer this question by reviewing the literature on review mechanisms and by conducting an in-depth, qualitative study of an existing process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that presents the closest available precedent to the GST: the (First) 2013-2015 Periodic Review (FPR). We deliberately limit our analysis to the FPR, because the characteristics of the GST undermine its comparability with review mechanisms in other international regimes. Due to these differences, other review mechanisms are unlikely to provide the design lessons we seek to identify with our analysis.
The article proceeds in five steps. After a brief introduction to the GST (Sect. 1) we outline five important differences between existing review mechanisms and the GST, highlighting the limited utility of lessons learned from those experiences (Sect. 2). In Sect. 3, we review the literature on regime effectiveness. The heart of the article consists of an empirical analysis of the FPR based on document analysis and interviews (Sect. 4).
We summarize our findings in the conclusion (Sect. 5) and briefly speculate on a number of external factors rather than internal design features that could affect the GST's effectiveness.
The global stocktake in context
The purpose of the GST is to ensure the effectiveness of the PA in the absence of legally binding mitigation (and other) obligations. Accepting that the previous approach of allocating specific mitigation burdens to developed country Parties based on a mutually negotiated agreement (the Kyoto Protocol) was not effective, the international community adopted the new pledge-and-review logic as a politically feasible solution despite doubts whether it can deliver climate stabilization. Against this background, the importance of the PA's transparency and review mechanisms for delivering the global public good can hardly be overstated.
The GST is a review mechanism, which feature in many multilateral regimes. Article 14 PA states that the parties "shall periodically take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress toward achieving the purpose this Agreement and its long-term goals." The purpose of the PA is to "strengthen the global response" to climate change (Article 2.1 PA). The agreement's long-term goals include a revised, but since 2009 familiar global temperature target, and two new socioeconomic goals for adaptation and international finance. The temperature goal was made more stringent: limiting global temperature increase to "well below 2 °C" while making efforts toward the more ambitious limit of 1.5 °C. Related to the temperature goal, mitigation goals of "global peaking" of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and "balancing" of emissions and their removals were introduced (Article 4.1 PA). The adaptation goal requires Parties to enhance adaptive capacity and resilience to enable low-GHG development. The practical meaning of this goal is unclear given the current lack of measurable indicators for adaptation progress and its context-dependent nature. The global finance goal aims to make "finance flows consistent with" low-carbon and climate-resilient development. The meaning of this formulation is also unclear. The first GST will take place in 2023, informing Parties in updating their NDCs in 2025. It will be repeated in five-year cycles.
In 2010, the Parties to the UNFCCC established a new review process that serves as a limited precedent for the GST. The Periodic Review was created along with the agreement on a long-term global temperature goal (then 2 °C), intended to regularly review (1) the adequacy of the temperature goal in the light of the objective of the Convention, which is a question of ambition, and (2) progress toward achieving this long-term goal, which is a matter of collective implementation.
1 The First Periodic Review (FPR) was conducted between 2013 and 2015 with the goal of informing the negotiations of the PA.
There are significant similarities and differences between the GST and the FPR (see Table 1 ). The FPR was mandated to review both progress toward the global temperature goal and its adequacy with regard to the Convention's objective of avoiding dangerous 1 3 climate change. The GST does not address adequacy-presumably the PA settled that question for the time being-but has a much broader scope of review, including multiple global goals and the overall purpose of the PA.
Given the similarities, Parties decided in 2015 to connect the FPR and the GST, requesting that the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice (SBSTA) advise on relevant insights from the FPR that can inform the design of GST (FCCC/CP/2015/10/ Add.1 para. 100).
The limited, albeit growing, body of scholarship on the GST focuses on its purpose as a "ratchet" or "ambition" mechanism, intended to galvanize collective action toward achieving global goals (van Asselt et al. 2015; Huang 2018; Northrop et al. 2018; Tompkins et al. 2018) . Scholars agree that the GST will play a crucial role in the international climate regime given the gap between NDC pledges and what it will take to achieve the temperature goal (Schleussner et al. 2016) . Particularly important is the GST's ability to provide transparency and enable a global assessment (Hermwille and Siemons 2018; Rajamani 2016) .
While this scholarship addresses different functions of the GST and related design issues, an analysis drawing lessons for the GST from the FPR experience (or from other international regimes) is still lacking despite Parties' request for these insights.
The global stocktake: a review mechanism sui generis
Review mechanisms in multilateral regimes tend to share a number of general features, including their purpose, the peer review process, or the role of technical expertise (Cecys 2010) . The GST as outlined in the PA departs from these general patterns in significant ways; its characteristics render it to some extent a global governance mechanism sui generis. Below we discuss five of these differences, concluding that existing review mechanisms in other international regimes likely provide very limited guidance for the design of the GST, especially with regard to its intended purpose as an ambition mechanism.
The double purpose
The GST's two main interdependent functions are to assess collective progress toward shared goals and to increase ambition over time. Authors have identified additional but (Hermwille and Siemons 2018) . The GST's assessment function reflects the logic of an effectiveness review (Bodansky 2010, p. 242 ) that might benefit from lessons from other regimes (Huang 2018) . Increasing ambition, however, is an uncommon purpose for a review mechanism, and, with the exception of the Periodic Review, comparison cases do not exist. Most review mechanisms hold countries accountable to a set behavioral standard, which usually consists of the goals and obligations established in an international agreement (e.g., the emission reduction obligations in the Kyoto Protocol). The GST lacks such a fixed standard because the PA's goals are vague and rely on nationally determined contributions. While a review of collective efforts toward the global mitigation goal via Parties' collective NDCs is possible (Vandyck et al. 2016 ), a collective behavioral standard in a particular review period (e.g., the amount of emissions that should globally be reduced) could only be derived with great difficulty by aggregating components of individual NDCs, whose timelines currently do not correspond with the GST cycles. Second, not even the global goals provide a solid benchmark: the long-term temperature target's formulation "well below 2 °C" leaves open what temperature would be satisfactory, and how that temperature relates to the global temperature reached at the end of a specific stocktaking period. There is even less clarity about any behavioral standards related to the new adaptation and finance goals.
Further, the idea of continuously increasing ambition does not allow for a fixed standard that does not change over time and presumably has no upper limit. The PA's logic only establishes a minimum standard, which is also constantly moving. This minimum standard is defined by the levels of action, support and cooperation during the current time period, which ought to be exceeded in the future.
Object: collective performance
The GST will assess the collective performance of all Parties by considering the aggregate effects of all national and cooperative efforts. A number of existing review mechanisms do something similar, including the IMF's Bilateral Surveillance and the Montreal Protocol's Implementation Review. The latter assesses Parties' collective contributions toward shared phase-out goals for ozone-depleting substances based on aggregate emissions data reported annually by each party. While this bears strong similarities to the GST's purpose of assessing collective progress toward global mitigation goals, the Implementation Review is of a much more technical nature than the GST-a mere collection and aggregation of emission data. Further, the global adaptation and finance goals present very different measuring challenges than the temperature goal. Assessing collective progress of this kind is a qualitative rather than quantitative exercise that does not lend itself easily to data aggregation efforts (Craft and Fisher 2018; Tompkins et al. 2018 ).
The role of science
All multilateral reviews rely on some form of technical expertise (e.g., highly trained safety inspectors under the nuclear nonproliferation regime). However, because of the need to deal with long time horizons of climate change, science has an elevated position in the GST compared to existing review mechanisms. Scientific knowledge, especially computational modeling of future scenarios, is the primary information source available about future climate and social conditions. The assessment of progress toward the new finance and adaptation goals will require different scientific information-rooted in the social rather than climate sciences-as well as non-scientific expertise.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will play a key role in providing this kind of input, but additional sources of knowledge and expertise will be needed. Non-IPCC expertise can provide more recent and more specific knowledge than IPCC reports (e.g., real-time assessments of new policies and their potential impacts). Major research-oriented think tanks and policy advocacy platforms are in a better position than the IPCC to develop this kind of dynamic knowledge in conversation with the policy community. Establishing an effective interface and communication modes with these more distributed and diverse providers of expertise will be a particular challenge for the GST.
Information gathering
Unlike most existing review mechanisms, the initial phase of information gathering and aggregation for the GST is unlikely to involve in-country visits. Instead, it can build on information produced in other UNFCCC processes (e.g., national communications), by the Secretariat, other international organizations, or scientific organizations. Parties' NDCs, mid-century strategies and related reporting under Article 13 PA will also become key inputs for the GST.
Concerning necessary and appropriate information sources, existing review mechanisms offer an important lesson: the rules for the GST should evolve over time. The need for flexibility implies that beyond a list of minimum initial information requirements, the process should remain open to changing kinds of input over time.
Information gathered or created by non-party stakeholders might provide important and timely insights that go beyond the reporting capabilities of governments and international organizations. However, allowing for third-party contributions presents significant challenges and would be a fairly unique feature of the GST compared to other multilateral review mechanisms (van Asselt 2016) . In existing review processes, NGOs and independent experts are sometimes consulted during the in-country visit, leveraging the organization's national experience. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) goes furthest in allowing for input from civil society organizations. Anybody can provide information about a state's human rights record to the UNHCR secretariat, which compiles this information into a short report. NGO representatives can attend, but not actively participate, in the UPR dialogue sessions, where the state under review is questioned by other UNHCR member states. None of these experiences apply directly to the GST, because it is not intended to scrutinize individual countries, but given the potentially large number of third-party contributors, some kind of information filtering and prioritization process will be needed.
Collective learning
The key mechanism for achieving the multiple purposes of the GST is collective learning, a major challenge for the climate regime in the past (Depledge 2006) . Collective learning has always been a central feature of multilateral negotiations in the UNFCCC, e.g., defining the meaning of "dangerous interference with the climate system" (Leemans and Vellinga 2017) . The ultimate rationale of the GST is to facilitate the development of a shared understanding among all Parties of the meaning, measurement and status of progress toward all shared goals and the overall purpose of the PA. This involves not only factual learning, which is a common feature in multilateral review mechanisms, but also the collective construction of meaning, including new normative expectations and identities (Checkel 1998; Wendt 1994) . Factual learning can be achieved with aggregation and assessment of new data. Meaning-making involves much more than that. Through continuous communication, Parties need to share ideas and opinions regarding the meaning of data and certain concepts (e.g., adaptation goal). Differences in national perspectives have to be aligned over time, involving value changes, compromise and associated emotional experiences among participants. Ultimately, the community has to stabilize the meaning of a concept by settling on and consistently using a single, dominant understanding of the term.
In general, review mechanisms do not serve as platforms for meaning-making, but in the case of the GST, this particular function looms large.
Review mechanisms in global governance
In the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms, the key function of review mechanisms in international regimes is to ensure regime effectiveness. Bodansky distinguishes implementation, compliance and effectiveness reviews, noting that the latter is most common (2010, p. 242) . Determining whether a specific review mechanism is successful depends on one's definition of regime effectiveness, an assessment to what extent a review process contributed to the regime's effectiveness defined in that way, and the fulfillment of the specific purpose of the review mechanism in question.
There are limited studies of the effectiveness of multilateral review mechanisms, including, for example, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade Policy Review (Laird 1999) , the UNHCR's Universal Periodic Review (McMahon and Ascherio 2012), or the Implementation Review of the Montreal Protocol (Handl 1997; UNEP 2012) . Their varied insights suggest that these mechanisms have to respond to the specific governance context, evolve over time, allow for differentiation between different types of countries, tend to suffer from resource challenges, and sometimes benefit from the involvement of non-state actors (van Asselt et al. 2015) .
Review mechanisms contribute to regime effectiveness by creating transparency through information gathering and sharing, and accountability by holding actors responsible for non-compliance with behavioral standards, norms, and obligations (Kramarz and Park 2016) . Given the GST's function to ensure regime effectiveness by enabling transparency and accountability, our literature review first discusses the meaning of effectiveness for the climate regime, then moving to institutional design and accountability.
Defining regime effectiveness and review mechanism effectiveness
A well-established literature distinguishes different definitions of regime effectiveness. Young (1994) , for example, puts forth six definitions, including (1) problem solving, i.e., the effect of an environmental regime on the biogeophysical conditions of Earth, (2) goal attainment, which can be entirely independent of problem solving, and (3) behavioral change, including policy and regulatory changes within countries.
Problem solving and behavioral change have received significant scholarly attention (Hisschemöller and Gupta 1999; Young 2001) , because an effective regime "channels 1 3 behavior in such a way as to eliminate or substantially ameliorate the problem that led to its creation" (Young and Levy 1999, p. 1) . In most cases, behavior change is more easily traceable than problem solving, biasing research toward this definition of effectiveness (Haas et al. 1993) .
By significantly expanding and diversifying the set of global goals included in the PA as compared to previous climate agreements, its negotiators have rendered goals and goal pursuit central features of the regime. This has behavioral implications for Parties, requiring changes in domestic policies, regulations, institutions, and social relations. The PA's main tools for recording and tracking behavior change among its Parties are the NDCs. Similar to the experience among researchers of regime effectiveness, it will be easier to observe and measure behavior change than goal achievement. Despite the inevitable link between the two, the PA explicitly separates the tracking of behavior change (Art. 13) and collective goal achievement (Art. 14), presenting an analytical challenge for determining how those two phenomena are connected.
Regime effectiveness can be distinguished from, but is linked to, the effectiveness of the regime's review mechanism(s). For example, the GST is intended to affect Parties' behaviors as they relate to global goal achievement and can be considered effective if and to the extent it contributes to the upward revisions of NDCs over time. However, a review mechanism is not the sole determinant of a regime's effectiveness.
The Periodic Review's purpose-to review the adequacy of and progress toward the global temperature goal-implies two dimensions of effectiveness that could be considered relevant for the GST. First, the Periodic Review is effective if it results in an updated, shared assessment among Parties concerning the adequacy of the temperature goal. The substance of that assessment is less important than the process's ability to generate agreement. If Parties jointly conclude that the current temperature goal is inadequate, the Periodic Review could trigger a separate discussion about the need to revise the goal-an ambition-related outcome. Whether or not the goal is consequently revised depends on many other factors, but one could argue that such a revision would be an important indicator for the effectiveness of the review mechanism. The GST will not consider questions of goal adequacy. However, the process's ability to generate agreement among Parties concerning the (in)sufficiency of progress toward the shared goals will be key, regardless of the substance of that agreement. Second, the review of progress toward the current temperature goal in the Periodic Review is successful if it creates transparency and learning among Parties, potentially triggering adjustments in national policies (i.e., behavioral responses) to increase the likelihood of meeting the goal. In that sense, the Periodic Review and the GST are successful if they contribute to global goal achievement by affecting the (mitigation) behavior of Parties.
Focusing on these two definitions of effectiveness-goal achievement and behavior change-we turn to the question of the most suitable design of the GST to support these outcomes.
Institutional design
Review mechanisms are institutions nested within a regime; their effectiveness depends at least to some extent on their design (Andresen and Hey 2005) . The literature on international regimes (Krasner 1983; Haas et al. 1993 ) emphasizes the context-dependent nature of each institutional design challenge, including the constellation of actors and their interests, power distribution, the state of the larger international system, dominant norms, and prior knowledge or experience. Further, institutions are usually built on the basis of existing institutions, giving them a nested quality (Young and Levy 1999) while path dependency presents distinct constraints and opportunities.
More specific insights on institutional design at the regime level appear moderately promising for the PA but do not easily apply to the GST. For example, regime effectiveness does not require a legally binding agreement (Bodansky 2015) , or that the regime has regulatory functions (Young 2011, p. 19,855) . Broad regime participation tends to be more important than stringent regime requirements and obligations (Barrett and Stavins 2003) . Further, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy are important to elicit regime compliance (Klinsky et al. 2017; Young 2011 ).
Accountability and transparency
Accountability can generally be understood as the requirement to take responsibility for one's actions and omissions, at a minimum in the form of publicly accepting one's failure to comply with the behavioral expectations of others (Biermann and Gupta 2011; Mason 2008) . This requires the existence of a behavioral standard like a treaty obligation, an actor subject to this standard, an audience, and a process of judgment.
Creating transparency about actors' past performance and providing the opportunity to justify their (in)actions are core components of an accountability process. A key psychological mechanism at work is naming and shaming, a tactic that relies on normative appeals, leveraging cognitive and emotional processes to influence an actor's pattern of behavior (Friman 2015; Mercer 2014) . It can be both uncomfortable and costly to be the target of naming and shaming efforts, which motivates actors to change certain practices (Krain 2012) .
The PA's Enhanced Transparency Framework serves to create accountability for individual Parties, where each Party's NDC functions as a behavioral standard. Yet, the GST is more complicated. Focusing exclusively on collective behavioral standards like achieving global goals and the overall purpose of the PA, the GST does not hold any individual party to account, but all Parties as a collective. It is unclear whether collective naming and shaming could work.
Lessons from the 2013-2015 periodic review
Given the limited utility of lessons derived from review mechanisms in other regimes due to the unique nature of the GST, especially its purpose as an ambition mechanism, we focused our efforts to identify potential design principles on an analysis of the FPR. The FPR presents the closest available precedent to an ambition mechanism in global governance today, though current experiences with the National Voluntary Reviews under the Sustainable Development regime might provide additional insights over time (Huang 2018) . We first discuss our methodological approach and then present key results. Section 4 interprets these results to crystallize a set of design lessons for the GST.
Methods
We used a multi-methods research design, integrating document analysis, interviews, and observations, to identify potential lessons from the FPR for the GST.
For the purpose of a qualitative document analysis, we established a database containing the following types of documents: all documentation on the FPR, all documents related to current APA negotiations on the GST (Agenda Item 6) between 2016 and May 2018, and all Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reports from meetings between 2010 and 2017. All resources are listed in Appendix A (Electronic Supplementary Material). Codebook development combined a theoretically informed approach with a grounded theory approach. Based on the literature on institutional design and regime effectiveness, we identified initial thematic coding terms (e.g., purpose, process features, and major outcomes) and added additional codes (e.g., increasing ambition, knowledge, and learning) in the process of coding. We used NVivo, a qualitative software and statistical analysis program, to code all documents and to analyze the database with a focus on two primary goals: establishing the key process features of the FPR, and identifying potential lessons or best practices to inform the GST's design.
We complemented the document analysis with observations during two negotiation sessions, the meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in May 2017 (SB 46) and the Conference of the Parties in November 2017 (COP 23), as well as twenty-four semi-structured interviews with select individuals who had either participated in the FPR (eight diplomats, twelve scientists, one Secretariat member, one NGO observer), or were negotiators responsible for the GST in the APA (two). Participating diplomats represented the European Union, the Alliance of Independent Latin American Countries, the African Group, the Alliance of Small Island States, and the Umbrella Group. Interview questions focused on the purpose of the FPR, its unique features, individual's perceptions of what made it successful, and how it compares to the GST. All interviews took place either in person during SB 46 or COP 23, or via Skype between these two negotiation sessions. They were recorded and transcribed for coding and analysis.
Results
We identified success criteria related to three dimensions of the FPR: the general nature of the process, procedural characteristics, and outputs and outcomes. It is worth noting that interviewees primarily shared positive remarks about the FPR, even when their national interests might oppose greater ambition. It is possible that other FPR participants might have had a more negative view of the FPR, but were unwilling or unable to speak with us.
Nature of the FPR
The data revealed five bundles of the FPR's characteristics that significantly contributed to its success: it was (1) inclusive, open, and transparent; (2) fair and unbiased; (3) a true science-policy dialogue; (4) predominantly technical; and (5) efficient.
(1) Multiple interviewees highlighted inclusiveness, openness, and transparency as related and important features of the FPR process. There were no attendance restrictions and the timing of the meetings during regular negotiation sessions enabled the participation of representatives from developing countries. Inclusiveness related to the demographic representation of the global North and South among experts, delegates, and the observer community. The co-facilitators went to great lengths to be accessible to all participants, with a standing invitation to raise concerns, contribute to guiding questions, and shape the agenda. They also provided a regular information flow and documentation of the process to avoid surprises and create the sense that the FPR was a party-driven process:
…We had an open call on purpose. Any Party can any time make inputs; they can approach us; they can send us a submission. And we also informed regularly the Parties about what we were doing, where we were, what we knew, so that every Party could all the time get the feeling they're involved, or we are in control, or we drive this process.
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(2) Fairness and the lack of bias emphasize the balanced and equal treatment of all participants and their interests. Interviewees stated that every Party's concern was taken seriously and given equal consideration; nobody was sidelined or privileged. What we call fairness could also be described as neutrality or objectivity:
[They] made always sure they never forgot anyone, so we came back to whatever anyone said, so any Party they could trust -even if they were asked to be disciplined -they could trust that we could come back to that, and we always did…you take everyone very seriously… you always come back and take it serious, and you try to address these issues in an honest, frank way.
(3) Similar to the GST, the FPR's mandate required that it would be conducted "in light of the best available science." Multiple Parties viewed the FPR "as a clear and well-defined platform for reinforcing a science and evidence-based approach to addressing climate change" (New Zealand et al. 2013) . Through the Structured Expert Dialogue (SED), the FPR created a surprisingly rare, but important condition: a true science-policy dialogue. It was a setting for open exchange of ideas, face-to-face discussions, and mutual information flow between experts (primarily scientists, but also non-scientific experts) and policymakers over extended periods of time. It enabled the transfer of knowledge, the clarification of ideas, but also changed perceptions and perspectives among participants. It avoided political discussions among negotiators as well as scientific discussions among scientists. Through this very specific focus and dialogue format, the FPR created an active and effective learning environment. One participant commented: I think the review made an effort to try to bring the science to relatable terms. I think that's a valuable lesson that, uh, we need to keep working on, because it's very hard to bring the science to relatable terms to policy-makers… Because in that lies part of the silver bullet of that changing of the mindset, and then people actually understanding.
Some Parties expressed their expectation for such a direct exchange with scientific experts, sometimes with the intention to limit the political content of FPR discussions:
… the co-facilitators of the SED should ensure the content of the SED is focused solely on expert presentations, questions by Parties and follow-up dialogue based on expert-to-Party exchanges." (Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and USA 2014) A number of process rules enabled this effective science-policy interaction. Time allocation was key: The co-facilitators sought to limit presentations to one-third of the meeting, leaving two-thirds for discussion. They insisted on focusing on the facts-separating facts and corresponding problems from possible solutions-indicating that the fear of certain solutions often disables conversations about the facts in the first place. Guiding questions, 1 3 which were identified and communicated well in advance of any meeting, served to structure the conversations. The co-facilitators managed the content of scientific presentations, proactively engaging the presenting experts to ensure the information was easily comprehensible, relevant, and had not been shown before.
The co-facilitators consciously rejected the deficit model of learning (Sturgis and Allum 2004) as a simple matter of knowledge delivery and created a dialogue space instead. Participants reflected on this experience as a valuable process of meaning making-through the conversation, the science and IPCC reports became relevant and meaningful for individual Parties:
The SED which I found interesting was that it's the policy-makers and the negotiators from each country… wanted to discuss with the scientists about the assessment findings -what it means -so they clarified many things. They really wanted in their own way to understand what these scientific reports are about, and […] what is relevant from their national point of view. So, I think it was very good because that was the real science-policy dialogue, right?
Experts suggested that the SED was very different compared to the IPCC approval meetings, where scientists and negotiators are often pitted against each other in a politically contested environment. In contrast, scientists described the SED as cultivating a learning attitude and being a rewarding experience.
(4) The FPR's focus on science and assessment gave it a primarily technical characterit was seen as a learning environment that was not necessarily meant to achieve political goals. One interviewee clearly stated: "This was not a negotiation space." The distinction between the SED (a space to interact with experts) and the Joint Contact Group (the political supervisory body) facilitated this technical focus. The SED became the primary forum of interaction, while the politics moved into the background. However, the FPR became political in the end with the decision to create a formal output of the FPR ahead of the COP 21. After some discussion, participants supported the creation of a Technical Report, but it was clear that this document would have political implications.
(5) The efficient use of meeting time was a key contributor to the FPR's success and essential for facilitating a dialogue while covering a large amount of material over a twoyear period. In addition to limited presentation time, process rules avoided repetition in presentations (i.e., the "no graph twice" rule), ensured that everyone came prepared (i.e., by making discussion questions available in advance of meetings), and focused all conversations on topics that were considered relevant and interesting (i.e., by involving Parties in the development of guiding questions).
Process
The interview data and primary documents pointed to five process features that were important for the FPR's success. First, it separated a technical and political body (the SED and the Joint Contact Group), operating in parallel rather than in stages. The Joint Contact Group constantly shadowed the technical process, providing feedback and offering suggestions for procedural changes. Second, the process benefited from a certain amount of flexibility. For instance, adjusting the kinds of permissible inputs based on their availability, and making process changes based on the input of the Joint Contact Group. Third, the FPR started without the mandate to produce a formal output because of political tensions when the FPR was established. However, by the end of the review period, enough trust had been established and Parties supported a formal output. Fourth, interviewees argued that the hybrid nature of the FPR-not being a negotiation space but taking place within the negotiation context rather than outside of it-was important for its ability to influence the negotiation dynamics. Finally, the FPR was given a significant amount of time during multiple sessions over the course of two years, which was necessary to grapple with the relevant information.
Outputs and outcomes
Beyond the formal output of a technical report, the FPR resulted in a number of important outcomes that made it effective from the perspective of some interviewees. Most importantly, it changed some participating negotiators' beliefs concerning some issues under negotiation:
But in general, I think it was beyond the two goals, ya? It was understanding, um, and changing perception of Parties.
Substantively, the FPR's summary report suggested that the 2 °C temperature target was insufficient to prevent dangerous climate impacts as required by the Convention. Reflecting this key message, many FPR participants came out of the process with a revised perspective concerning the global temperature goal, which led to increasing political support for 1.5 °C. The latter had long been a demand of the small island states. Many interviewees attributed this change in Parties' acceptance of a more aggressive global temperature goal to the FPR:
In Copenhagen, it was about 34 Parties to my knowledge. In Paris, it was 106 who wanted 1.5 °C. And that was partly due to the SED, I am quite convinced.
Some interviewees argued that the inclusion of 1.5 °C in the PA was to some extent a result of the FPR. Going one step further, some even suggested that the inclusion of 1.5 °C was crucial for reaching an agreement in Paris:
I think the review has saved the PA. It's very simple.
Another interviewee suggested that the FPR also led to the recognition among developing country Parties that they would have to reduce their emissions too: …In general, by non-Annex accepting mitigation action. Before it was, like, we have no commitment. The thinking was we have to develop, we have to increase our emissions, and the responsibility is with the others to reduce their emissions as much as possible.
Discussion
Distilling lessons for the GST's design from the analyses above, it is important to keep in mind that these insights have limited transferability for at least two reasons: the unique characteristics of the GST that are not shared by other multilateral review mechanisms or the FPR, and differences in the political contexts for the GST and FPR, such as the somewhat marginal nature of the FPR versus the limelight the GST will receive on a regular basis.
Both the FPR and the GST share the ultimate purpose of raising ambition. The UNF-CCC Web site (UNFCCC n.d.) and a number of participants suggested that the FPR succeeded in that regard because "The outcome of the 2013-2015 review was a contributing factor to Parties' strengthening of the long-term global [temperature] goal. … It led to the decision (1/CP.21) on the new long-term global goal that was agreed in 2015." Based on our analysis, one could conclude that this success was as a result of the discussion of adequacy: participants came to believe that the 2 °C goal was inadequate to "prevent dangerous climate change" with the consequence of building political support for a more ambitious temperature goal in the PA. The GST, however, will not consider the adequacy of the global goals, but only progress made toward them. The motivation to raise ambition will have to have a different impetus than it did in the FPR.
Despite these differences, we suggest that the following five lessons drawn from the FPR experience can provide useful orientation when designing and conducting the GST. We briefly show how some these design principles are reflected in the Paris Agreement Work Program (PAWP)-generally referred to as the "rulebook"-adopted at COP 24 in December 2018. The APA's decisions concerning the design of the GST appears to build on the FPR experience in a number of ways, especially with the creation of a "technical dialogue" that largely mirrors the SED.
Inclusiveness, transparency, and fairness
Taking inclusiveness and transparency seriously by not limiting attendance, having meetings during normal negotiation sessions, and involving non-state actors will be essential for the success of the GST. These features are linked to trust, legitimacy, and the sense that the process is fair and party-driven. They are important to motivate broad and sustained participation, and to ensure that Parties actively and openly engage in a joint process of learning. Like the FPR, the GST should cultivate a sense of fairness by not privileging or sidelining any individual Party's questions or concerns. To achieve this aim, the GST could replicate some of the FPR's process rules as outlined above.
The discussions in the APA Working Group on the GST engaged these ideas. The PAWP includes the following paragraph:
Further decides that the global stocktake will be a Party-driven process conducted in a transparent manner and with the participation of non-Party stakeholders and that, to support such effective and equitable participation, all inputs will be fully accessible by Parties, [...] 
A learning platform
The success of the GST will largely depend on its ability to facilitate learning and meaning-making among Parties, especially with a view toward the practice of doing transformations. The FPR demonstrated that collective learning in a multilateral process is possible (e.g., collectively changing Parties' perceptions on the long-term temperature goal), given certain conditions and rules, including open, iterative, and structured interactions between experts and negotiators. While the various process features of the SED could be applied to the GST (in the technical dialogue), the larger scope of the GST will require some adjustments, such as the consideration of multiple global goals.
Further, Parties themselves should take on the role of experts more than they did in the FPR. Discussing their experience with efforts toward implementing their NDCs, best practices for implementation, and any implementation barriers or challenges could create a much-needed peer learning environment with a clear focus on practice and policy. At the same time, to ensure that this learning process is based on all relevant and available information, there should be an explicit and continuous involvement of non-state actors as providers of knowledge and expertise. Learning from experience and best practice was a theme in the GST negotiations in the APA, especially supported by statements and submissions from China (e.g., China 2017, p. 11). However, the PAWP text does not emphasize the learning and meaning-making dimensions of stocktaking.
Efficiency
Given the scope of the GST and the limited timeframe available compared to the FPR, efficiency will be paramount for achieving the goals of the review process. This includes the efficient use of meeting time, but also other resources, including funds and knowledge. Again, the FPR experience with its conscious rules for time and content management provides a useful blueprint.
Flexibility
A lesson from the literature, other regimes, and the FPR concerns the need for a flexible design of the GST. The process of collecting inputs for assessment and learning in the GST would benefit from flexibility. There should also be flexibility concerning the review process itself. For example, allowing for an adjustments of rules, procedures, and approaches over time in response to political conditions or learning from the GST experience itself. Another dimension of flexibility concerns GST participants, enabling possible changes in involved actors over time. The PAWP recognizes the importance of flexibility in process design in multiple places. For example, it states: "Decides to consider refining the procedural and logistical elements of the overall global stocktake process on the basis of experience gained after the first and subsequent global stocktakes, as appropriate"
Focus on technical work
The GST should focus on the technical work of assessment and learning. If these are done well, the experience of the FPR suggests that political effects can follow. Focusing on technical work means limiting the role of and time for negotiations, keeping discussions focused on science and expertise, and not aiming too early for a politically relevant formal output.
Conclusion
The GST is a global governance innovation. Like all multilateral review mechanisms, it is meant to ensure regime effectiveness, which we have defined as the achievement of regime goals and behavioral change among Parties. The GST is unique because of its additional function as an ambition mechanism and its sole focus on the collective performance of the Parties to the PA. The absence of a fixed standard for assessment and specific actors who could be held accountable for not meeting that standard presents very specific design challenges for this mechanism.
Based on a review of the literature on regime effectiveness, institutional design, accountability, and existing review mechanisms, we identified a number of general insights that could guide the institutional development of the GST, including the importance of ensuring broad participation, the need to create and maintain perceptions of legitimacy and fairness among all participants, and the advantages of flexibility and adaptiveness of the process over time.
Due to significant differences between the GST and review mechanisms in other multilateral regimes, we have argued that those other mechanisms offer only limited design lessons. Given the purpose of increasing ambition, it will be important to create a shared understanding among Parties concerning the baseline condition and the meaning of a number of relatively new terms in the process, including the global adaptation and finance goals. The assessment of collective progress toward global goals will require very specific data and information inputs that will have to be developed in real time collaboration with the scientific community, but also with other non-governmental knowledge producers, experts, and organizations. While scientific information, especially the products of the IPCC, will be essential, they will be insufficient as inputs to the stocktaking process.
The most important feature of the GST will be its ability to serve as a collective learning platform for the Parties to the PA. In addition to devising a "ratchet mechanism" that is truly capable of driving ambition in climate governance, the process could institutionalize a peer-learning platform for doing transformations, potentially involving non-state actors in a meaningful way that goes beyond the status quo in global governance.
When attempting to design an ambition mechanism, the creation of an effective and constructive learning environment-a space where participants can accumulate new knowledge but also change their perspectives, believes, and political interests-might be particularly important. The 2013-2015 FPR presents a limited, but valuable, and, so far, closest precedent for the GST in that regard. Our analysis of the FPR revealed a range of characteristics that made it successful from the perspective of its participants. These characteristics included inclusiveness, fairness, efficiency, and focus on mainly technical science-policy interactions that facilitated mutual learning and meaning-making in a structured dialogue format.
We have integrated the insights from these three analytic processes into five design lessons that might serve to guide the institutional development and implementation of the GST beyond the initial decisions of the Paris Agreement Work Program: (1) ensuring inclusiveness, transparency, and fairness, (2) creating a collective learning platform, (3) allowing for flexibility and adaptation over time while maintaining efficiency (4), and (5) emphasizing a technical work environment.
These process-oriented lessons cannot account for a range of other factors that will doubtlessly affect the success of the GST, both as a review and ambition mechanism. First and foremost, the GST will be not only a technical but also a political process; many political dynamics internal and external to the politics of climate change can affect its dynamics. These include the involvement of the USA, and the changing relationships between major powers in the UNFCCC (e.g., China, India, and the EU). Major climate shocks and their effects on global trade, health, security, water, and food availability might affect perceptions of what it means to "be on track" toward global goals, as could breakthroughs in climate science. Finally, the stability and normative architecture of the international system might change over time, presenting an increasingly challenging backdrop to the efforts to review progress and increase ambition in the global climate regime.
